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Abstract 
We show how an institutional provision designed to increase accountability of local legislature 
officials can lead to a distribution of power within the legislature which is not consistent with voters' true 
preferences. The cause of this inconsistency is the ballot design which asymmetrically affects the 
officials listed on it. We analyze the case of the Lima's 2013 city legislature recall referendum and show 
that, controlling for the legislators' individual characteristics, the design of the referendum ballot had 
adverse and significant effects on the composition of the Lima's city legislature, and examine the 
counterfactuals of different ballot designs. We show that the election results with more “neutral" ballot 
designs would have been significantly different, and the composition of the new council would have 
been more representative of voters' preferences. 
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1 Introduction
In 2000, Al Gore lost a significant amount of votes to Patrick Buchanan in Palm Beach Country,
Florida. Due to a confusing ballot design, around two thousand voters may have voted for the
latter by mistake (Wand et al., 2001). Later on, George W. Bush won the election in the state
of Florida by a thousand votes and became president of the United States. If a voter’s behavior
may be affected by the way in which the alternatives are presented to him in strong democracies,
we should pay attention to less developed ones as well. It may be the case that the layout of
ballots have a more pervasive influence in younger democracies, either because of unintentional
or deliberate manipulation.
In this paper, we use polling-booth level data to show that the ballot’s design explains
around 3% of the variation of the votes in a (removal) referendum in Lima in 2013. Moreover,
we show that different layouts would have led to completely dissimilar electoral results, changing
the composition of Lima’s local legislature in a significant way. Furthermore, we show that the
final political outcome may not have been representative of the preferences of the electorate
due to ballot-induced “choice fatigue”, i.e., when voters are faced with many options they are
more likely to cast a vote in the elections listed first than for the ones listed last (Augenblick
and Nicholson, 2015).
In 2013, in an unprecedented measure to increase political accountability, Lima’s citizens
had the opportunity to remove each of the forty local legislators, voting them out one by one.
However, due to a combination of poor ballot design and voters’ fatigue, rather than reinforcing
accountability, this removal referendum penalized disproportionately the majority coalition,
whose legislators were placed first in the ballot.
This removal referendum allows us to investigate the effect of choice fatigue on aggregate
outcomes cleanly because voters’ preferences are uncorrelated with the candidates’ positioning
in the ballot. Our identification follows from the (quasi) random allocation of voters to polling
booths, and the location of the legislators in the ballot, which did not depend on their popularity
or other observable characteristics. Thus, controlling for precinct unobservables and candidates
observables, we can estimate the causal effect of voters’ fatigue (due to the legislator’s position
in the ballot) on the removal referendum.
Our linear model specification shows the presence of choice fatigue: the share of blank votes
increases rapidly and continuously between the first and fortieth candidate. Moreover, since
candidates where listed in two columns, we also identify a large jump of blank votes between
the last candidate in the first column and the first one in the second column.
We then estimate the effect of the existing fatigue on the probability that any given candidate
is removed from the local council. With that aim, taking into account that voters face three
alternatives which do not need be independent of each other – YES, NO and BLANK – we also
explore the voters’ choice with a multinomial probit. Using the yes, no and blank shares by
polling booth (that is, 170 voters on average) we show that, not only the ballot design had an
effect on the vote shares, but also, more reasonable designs would have had completely different
outcomes. For instance, in a ballot with random order of legislators, everybody but the mayor
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would have been removed from office.
As a result, a constitutional provision meant to increase accountability, the removal referen-
dum, combined with a poor implementation that does not take into account (predictable) choice
fatigue might have had counterproductive consequences. Since the twenty legislators listed first
in the ballot, representing almost the whole majoritarian coalition, had to be replaced with a
by-election, the removal referendum may have caused Lima’s council to be less representative of
voters preferences: after the new council was put together, around 46% of politicians came from
the main opposition party (PPC - Partido Popular Cristiano), which saw its seats to increase
from 9 to 16, even though its maximum share of votes obtained in this period was less than
30%1.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 3 we discuss the institutional background, in
Section 4 we explain our econometric strategy, in Section 5 we show evidence of voters’ fatigue
and we quantify the effect of the ballot design on the electoral results by exploring the effects
of using alternative ballots. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the implication of our results and
we conclude.
2 Literature
Our findings indicate the presence of a political “Peltzman effect” (Peltzman, 1975): the in-
troduction of a provision meant to increase accountability may have the opposite consequences
if combined with poor implementation. In our case, the unintended consequences arise due to
a poorly designed ballot, which did not take into account documented evidence about choice
fatigue (Augenblick and Nicholson, 2015) and other behavioral anomalies related to the order
in which the options are presented to consumers (Rubinstein and Salant, 2006).
More generally, the puzzle of voting has caught the economists’ attention since Downs (1957):
if voting is costly, why do people vote in large elections when the probability of being pivotal
is arguably zero? The early theories of the calculus of voting Riker and Ordeshook (1968);
Downs (1957); Enelow and Hinich (1981) draw on voters’ heterogeneity to explain abstention
decisions. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) highlights that a comprehensive theory of turnout
and abstention should also explain the phenomenon of roll-off 2. Closer to the point in our
paper, ballot design is not innocuous as it may favor the candidates ranked first - priming effect
(Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012; Meredith and Salant, 2013)), or ranked last - anti-priming
effect (Alvarez et al., 2006). Augenblick and Nicholson (2015) suggests the presence of voting
fatigue using a natural experiment in California, and they show that when an election appears
sooner in a ballot, there is a significant lower number of abstentions.
There is much evidence about the effect of the set and order of alternatives on consumers’
choice outside political economy. Among others, Feenberg et al. (2015) show that the order in
1And Peru Posible, another opposition party, moved from 1 to 7 legislators, even though it obatined only 11%
of the votes.
2As explained in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996): “Roll-off occurs when voters who are already at the polls
decide not to vote on a race or issue”.
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which papers appear at a NBER mailing list affects the short run number of citations, Liu and
Simonson (2005) show that pairwise comparison of products leads to more consumption than a
sequential one, and Glejser and Heyndels (2001) show that participants who perform later in a
music contest are more likely to get more positive evaluations from the jury.3
3 Institutional Background
3.1 Political background.
Peru´ is a federal representative democracy subdivided into 25 regions and the capital city, Lima.
Each region is composed by provinces and municipalities. Institutionally and politically, the
Municipality of Lima has the status of a region rather than a city, despite its name. It is also the
largest city of Peru with 8.5 million inhabitants and hosts the executive, judiciary and legislative
branches of the national government of Peru. In 2010, Susana Villaran runs for mayor of Lima
as the leader of a center-left coalition of parties. In October of that same year, Villaran is the
first elected woman to become mayor of Lima.
3.1.1 Institutional setting
The city is run by a mayor (the maximum administrative authority of the executive branch) and
thirty nine city legislators - regidores.4 These forty politicians are chosen in a municipal election
every four years by popular vote with a closed-list proportional rule that gives an automatic
majority (twenty out of forty regidores) to the party with most votes. All remaining seats are
assigned proportionally.5
3.1.2 Removal referendum
The Constitutional reform of 1993 added the possibility of calling for a removal referendum,
known as Consulta Popular de Revocatoria (CPR). This provision, meant to keep politicians
accountable, implies that all subnational politicians holding office can be exposed to a non-
confidence vote at (almost) any time of their mandate.
A removal referendum takes place only after a formal request by the citizens that live in the
jurisdiction of the politician under scrutiny. In the case of Lima 400 thousand signatures are
needed to proceed with a removal referendum.
The electoral rule used is simple majority rule: if the non-confidence votes to a politician
are more than the confidence ones, then he is recalled and he must be replaced. If more than
thirteen legislators are recalled, a new election takes place to replace them. Otherwise, they
3From a theoretical perspective, Rubinstein and Salant (2006) point out that an increasing number of choices
are made out of list sets, and study the conditions under which the independence of irrelevant alternatives
axiom (IIA) can be extended to a list-IIA. Kamenica (2014) shows that choice overload can be exploited by a
profit-maximizing monopolist by introducing a premium loss leader product.
4As stipulated in Ley Organica de Municipalidades.
5Closed-list proportional rule implies that each party proposes a pre-defined list of 40 candidates and his
substitutes, and citizens choose a party, without any interference on the list composition.
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are substituted by a party member who was on the closed list presented by the party in the
original election. If needed, in the by-election, the new legislators are elected by a closed-list
proportional rule (without a bonus to the winner).
3.1.3 Ballot design
The ONPE (“Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales”) is an independent body in charge of
organizing and administering the elections and referenda in Peru. It was created in 1993, and
among other tasks, is in charge of designing the ballot papers. For the removal referendum of
March 17th 2013, when forty candidates were up for removal, the final ballot design sticked to
the following rules: parties are ordered downward according to the number of legislators and,
within the party order, legislators are ordered according to their order in the 2010 closed list,
which was determined by the parties. Hence, the ballot used in 2013 had the forty candidates
listed in two columns without including any partisan identification or picture, as shown in Figure
B.1.
3.1.4 Voters
Voting is mandatory in Peru. When citizens turn 18 years old, they are issued a national I.D.
(D.N.I.) and they are assigned an “electoral number” that determines the polling booth where
they have to vote. This number is assigned according to the order in which citizens got their
I.D. As we discuss later, a direct implication of this mechanism is that within a polling center,
any two polling booths, have the same ex-ante distribution of votes.
3.2 The Data
In 2010, there was a city-wide election to choose the municipal authorities. Six parties or
coalitions had managed to elect at least a legislator (see Table B.3). In 2013, the forty legislators
were put up for a confidence vote, in which citizens had to decide, for each legislator, whether
to remove him/her (e.g. vote YES), or not (e.g. vote NO). In November 2013, a by-election
to elect the substitutes of the recalled candidates was held. We use the electoral data of these
elections and of each of the candidates subjected to the removal referendum. Except for the
electoral data by polling booth – which was provided by ONPE after our request – all the data
is available at ONPEs website (www.onpe.gob.pe), unless stated otherwise.
3.2.1 Electoral data and candidates characteristics
The mayor and twenty one legislators belonged to coalition Fuerza Social (FS), thirteen to coali-
tion PPC - Unidad Nacional, two from party Restauracion Nacional, one from party Cambio
Radical, one from party Somos Peru, and one from partySiempre Unidos.
There are 36,740 booths divided in 888 centers throughout Lima’s 43 districts. Polling
booths do not all have the same number of registered voters, but they cannot be larger than 300
voters, by constitutional design. In 2013, the total number of the eligible voters was 6,357,243,
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with a turnout rate of 83,7%. Figure B.3 shows that the blank votes for each candidate display
a large variance, which increases with the position of the candidates in the ballot. Figure B.4,
the actual votes for Yes and No for each candidate, summarizes the results from the referendum:
the mayor was kept in her place, while candidates in positions 2 to 21, from Fuerza Social were
recalled. Also candidates in position 26 and 31, both from PPC - Unidad Nacional were recalled
(discussed below).
The support for all the parties is relatively stable across districts (see Table B.3), with the
noticeable exception of PPC - Unidad Nacional, with the largest standard deviation among the
parties that have won a seat. This party obtained large support in less populated areas, with
an average of 40%, even though the total actual share was 37.5%.
Candidates characteristics. Table B.2 shows the candidates observable characteristics, or-
dered by their position in the ballot. The median legislator is a 49 years old male politician
with college degree, who had won a local election once, but with no experience in national
politics. As it can be seen by media exposure, the median candidate is almost unknown to the
voters. This variable is constructed with the mentions of the forty legislators or regidores in
the period between 2010 and March 2013, in the five most important newspapers from Peru´ (El
Comercio, La Repu´blica, Peru´ 21, Gestio´n and Correo). Although it is the variable with the
most disparity, the median candidate has been mentioned only three times in the three years
previous to the removal referendum. The candidates with the most mentions are the mayor
(Villara´n, with 1068 mentions), and Luis Castan˜eda Jr, the son of a previous mayor6.
4 Empirical strategy
To examine the relationship between the results of the removal referendum for a legislator and
her position in the ballot, we estimate two models, described below.
4.1 Estimation strategy
To analyze the effect of candidates positioning in the ballot on his electoral performance, we
begin by analyzing the following linear model:
Yidl = αθd + βXl + γZl + εidl (1)
In Equation 1 we explain the share of blank votes of legislator in position l in polling booth
i in precinct d, Yidl, as a result of the politicians individual characteristics, Xl, and the position
on the ballot, Zl. θd captures the precincts characteristics, either as a fixed effect or as other
variables such as poverty, depending on the specification. More importantly, precincts refer to
the geographical location of the polling booth, either the polling center or the district, depending
6Castan˜eda Jr., who was allegedly behind the call for a removal referendum, may also be confused with Luis
Castan˜eda Sr., so we may be overstating his media exposure). Incidentally, Castan˜eda Sr. was elected mayor
when Villaran finished her mandate
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on the specification. To show the robustness of our results, we also explore the effect of the
ballot design on the share of blank votes per candidate with a non-linear probability model
with aggregate data. In all specifications we cluster the standard errors by official and polling
center (Center ×Order), and in all estimations of Equation 1, the precinct fixed effects are at
the polling center level. 7
We also run a multinomial probit to explore non-linear effects on the share of YES and NO
votes in our specification. Our approach to the multinomial estimation is based on a model of
voting with additive noise, a la Banks and Duggan (2005), explained in detail in the Appendix
in Section A.2. Moreover, these estimates are the main input for building the counterfactuals
in the next section.
Even though precincts fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity, there might be
other confounding voters or candidates characteristics. Both can be ruled out by design, as we
explain in the next section. Regarding the former, within a polling center, the allocation of
voters to polling booths is (quasi) random, hence in any two polling booths within a polling
center we should expect similar outcomes. Regarding the latter, the position of the politicians
in the ballot does not depend on individual characteristics, but the parties.
4.2 Identification strategy
Our identification relies on two sources of exogenous variation: the (quasi) random allocation
of voters to polling centers and polling booths, and the pre-determined order of candidates in
the ballot during the 2013 removal referendum.
In first place, the citizens’ political preferences are orthogonal to the voters’ allocation to
polling booths, by design: as citizens turn 18 years old and get their I.D.s, they are automatically
registered as voters in a given polling booth and center. Thus, this allocation only depends on
the order in which citizens get their I.D. Concerns about cohort effects - if voters ideology
depends on age - are taken care of with the inclusion of polling-center fixed-effects, which
controls for heterogeneity across centers.
In second place, the candidates order in the ballot is determined jointly by the performance
of their party/coalition in the 2010 elections, and their position in the closed list for that
same election. Hence, the main determinant of the legislators position of the ballot, specially
the column, is not determined by his personal characteristics but by the party’s popularity
(nonetheless, we will also control for the candidates’ characteristics). Moreover, since Fuerza
Social and PPC-Unidad Nacional were coalitions of parties, a politician’s position within the
coalition would depend more on his party bargaining power rather on his own skills or electoral
potential.
Finally, to reinforce the idea that the votes for a politician in 2013 and his position in the
ballot cannot be jointly determined, we argue that the voters’ information on the candidates
is very poor. The ballot design does not include any other information than the candidates’
7Even though it should not be concern in our case due to the lack of information about the legislators, we also
use multiway clustering a la Cameron and Miller (2015). As we will show below, the standard errors increase –
as expected – but all our main coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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names, and except for notable exceptions (the mayor and the son of the former mayor), all
these local legislators are relatively unknown to the population (except for Villaran – in the
first position – and Castan˜eda Jr. – in position thirty one, as commented above).
4.2.1 Validity of the identification strategy
As shown in Figures B.1 (the actual ballot) and B.2 (the ballot with party identification),
at the time of voting, citizens have no information about the candidates except for their last
names. Concerns with our identification strategy may arise if voters knowledge about the seating
legislators was correlated with their position in the ballot. Nonetheless, these local politicians
are not only unknown, but also they lack significant previous political experience (see Table
B.4).
Moreover, if voters had used other informational cues, e.g. being first within the closed-
party list, we should observe jumps in the number of blank votes. In Figure B.5, that shows the
change in blank vote shares between any two consecutive candidates in the ballot, we can see
that the only jumps in that variable occur for the mayor, with the change of column and with
Castan˜eda. In all other cases, including the jump from one party to the other, the increase in
blank shares is steady.
Last, despite Lima’s large population density, it could be argued that within a polling
center, across polling booths, there could be selection of voters, undermining our identification
strategy. Fortunately, we can even add polling booth fixed effects to account for this possible
source of bias due to omitted variables. While in the appendix we show that our results would
not change, confirming that there is no such problem of endogeneity – the coefficients are
statistically identical to our main regressions – we prefer the polling center fixed effects.
5 Results
5.1 Determinants of voting blank
The effect of order, column and the candidates’ characteristics on the share of blank votes per
candidate are reported in Table B.6. Remarkably, in all specifications the signs of our estimates
are the same, even when we omit the polling center fixed-effects, suggesting that our estimates
do not depend of the distribution of preferences within a polling center.
In all models, the position of the legislator on the ballot has a very strong effect on his
share of blank votes: the coefficients of Order, Column and their interaction are all statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level. While Order and Column are positive, indicating that being
further down the ballot leads to more blank votes, the interaction coefficient is negative. Across
all specifications, being ten positions further away implies an increase in blank votes by 1.3
percentage points. Furthermore, being in the second column increases the blank votes in 4.4
percentage points. This evidence indicates that citizens follow the order in which candidates
appear in the ballot, instead of jumping across columns.8
8One could think that voters begin by looking at the first two candidates in the first row – candidate 1 and
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Some remarks are in order: although the effect of the order in which the legislator is placed
is an important predictor of the share of blank votes, this effect decreases in the second column.
The blank share is increasing at a lower rate compared to the first column. One possible
interpretation of this result is that voters who keep voting in the second column may have a
lower cost of voting, i.e., there is a selection of voters. Hence, the rate at which they stop voting
is smaller. This interpretation may have implications beyond the decision to abstain: if voters
“self-select” into the second column, their preferences and their voting behavior may be differ
in comparison to the set of voters in the first column. It could be worrying that the cost of
voting is correlated with preferences. A first attempt to correct this issue is in column (3) of
the same table, where we control for the voters preferences in the previous election (the variable
“Party share in 2010”). We observe no change in our estimates, which suggests that the above
mentioned correlation does not take place here.9
Both the coefficients of for Villaran (position 1 - Mayor) and Castan˜eda are significant with
a negative sign, showing that controlling for ballot effects, party affiliation and other individual
characteristics voters were more likely to express their opinion about these two compared to the
remaining ones. These findings are consistent with what we see in Figure B.3.
Focusing in column (3), where we have the extended set of covariates of individual charac-
teristics we see that none of them has a great effect on the blank vote behavior, in comparison
to Order and Column. This is also in line with our identifying assumption: with the exception
of the two famous faces of the campaign (Villaran and Castan˜eda) the public cannot distinguish
among different officials in the ballot. Nonetheless, if anything, exposure has a negative effect:
having been a candidate in a previous national election, won or not, and having won a local
election, decreases the blank shares. We find the same effect with the number of mentions in
national newspapers (the variable “media exposure”).
Finally, belonging to the right-wing coalition (PPC - Unidad Nacional) further increases
the share of blank votes by 4.4 percentage points. Table B.7 shows the squared semi-partial
correlation coefficients for the linear estimation of column 3 of Table B.6. Order and Column
account for most of the variance in the model. Columns (4) to (6) indicate that our results do
not depend on the linearity imposed in the first three columns. 10
5.2 Analysis of the probability of being removed from office
Table B.8 depicts the results of the multinomial probit in which the probability of voting blank
is the baseline. The upper table shows the results for the NO and the lower part the YES
ones, always with respect to blank. Our preferred specification is in the third column, where we
21 – instead of the first two candidates in the first column – candidates 1 and 2. This is ruled out by the data.
9We also address this issue in our multinomial specification.
10Even though our identifying assumptions are not too demanding, it could be argued that within a polling
center, there may be significant differences across polling booths that may be biasing our results. In Column (2)
of Table (B.10), we show the results with polling booth fixed effects, and the coefficients are identical. Moreover,
in the first column of that table we cluster the standard erros in a different way, following Cameron and Miller
(2015) multiway clustering. This clustering is more demanding and increases the standard errors, but still all our
coefficients of interest are significant at the 1% level.
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control both for District fixed effects and the extended set of covariates, but the three estimated
models are qualitatively similar. The effect of Order, Column and their interaction are in line
with our previous results: the share of YES and NO decreases with respect to the blank votes as
the candidates are further down in the ballot. Interestingly, while both coefficients for Mayor
are positive, indicating a relatively divided opinion about keeping her or not, the coefficients
on Castan˜eda are negative for NO vote and positive for YES. This result shows a large level of
agreement on removing him from the local council in Lima, in line with Figure B.4. The effects
of Party Share in 2010 elections have the expected signs: the higher the party share of an
official, the more likely that this official receives a no vote compared to a blank one, which is
also more likely compared to a no one.
Since the coefficients of YES and NO vote of each covariate are often quite similar, pairwise
statistical comparisons were in order. In the third column all coefficients, with the exception of
the ones of Order, College, Candidate in national elections and Media Exposure, are statistically
different between the YES and NO equations. 11 Finally, “media exposure” generally decreases
the share of blank votes favoring the NO votes over the YES votes. Hence, if anything, more
mentions in national newspapers augments the probability of being kept in office. The opposite
is true for legislators that held a national office before. The difference in model fitness between
the first column and the other two may indicate the presence of heterogeneity among the districts
which we address below.
Analysis by district. Table B.9 shows the results of the multinomial probit in two districts:
Villa El Salvador and San Isidro. Villa El Salvador is the district where “Fuerza Social” (the
incumbent party) obtained their highest share in the 2010 election, whereas San Isidro is the
district where “PPC-Unidad Nacional” got their highest share, which is the same district where
Fuerza Social got their lowest share. Although all the coefficients are consistent with our
previous results, some very interesting patterns emerge. The effects of Order and Column are
larger in column (1), a left-wing district, than in column (2), a right-wing one. Hence, the design
of the ballot seems to have more pervasive effects in the district where the mayor was elected
with the largest share. Although this results does not threaten our identification strategy, in
order to make policy recommendations we have to take into account the districts’ heterogeneity
of preferences, as we do in the next section.12
5.3 Counterfactual Analysis and Discussion
Based on our previous results, we analize what would have happened in Lima if the design of
the ballots were different. Since the legislators’ location is the main explanatory variable, we
11In the second column the test cannot reject the null hypothesis only in the case of the coefficients of Minor
Parties. However, in the first column it is only the the coefficients of Mayor, Castan˜eda and the constant that
the null hypothesis is rejected.
12Related, but less surprising is the fact that the share of NO votes for Villaran, the mayor, is larger with
respect to the blank votes in the left-wing district than in the righ-wing one (San Isidro). Similarly, Castan˜eda
has larger support in San Isidro, while the voters in Villa El Salvador do not show any differential treatment of
this candidate.
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explore designs that change their position in the ballot: in particular, we randomize the order
of the legislators and/or we eliminate the columns.
Since we have to incorporate the districts’ hetoregeneity to provide the most accurate coun-
terfactuals, we do the analysis by district (for the 43 districts, as with El Salvador and San
Isidro above), we collect the estimated coefficients and, taking into account the districts size,
we perform our exercises. Figure B.6 shows the fitted values of the multinomial probit model
(run by district). Comparing with the actual results in Figure B.4 we see that the model does
a good job reproducing the referendum results.
In order to see how the ballot design affected the referendum result we force the Column
and Order coefficient to be zero for all officials. Hence we obtain the predicted values as if the
ballot design had no effect: Figure B.7 shows this result.13 For all officials except the mayor, the
YES votes are a majority, meaning that everybody except the mayor would had been recalled.
In practical terms, this result shows what the outcome would had been if every voter received
a different single-column ballot where the order of the officials was completely randomized.
In order to be more precise, we simulate the elections varying the order and the columns.
First, we assigned each district a different random order in the ballot, calculated the referendum
result predictions, and repeated this process one thousand times. Then we collected the results
of the repetitions and calculated the share of recalls for each official. Figure B.8 shows the result
of this process when assuming a two-column ballot and Figure B.9 shows the result assuming a
single column. Starting with the latter, we see that in almost all repetitions, it is only the mayor
who is not getting recalled. On the other hand, with two columns in almost all repetitions it
is only the mayor who survives the recall from her coalition. As for the opposition, Castan˜eda
gets recalled almost always, while the rest of the officials of the right-wing coalition get recalled
some of the time.
The predicted values and the simulations point into the same direction: the ballot design
had given an “unfair” advantage to all the legislators located in the second column. A proper
randomization, even keeping two columns, would have ended up in completely different electoral
outcomes. For simplicity of interpretation, let us focus on the case with a single column. If
all legislators had been recalled, the final composition of the city council after the by-election
for the new members would have ended up having only less than a third of legislators from
the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC). Instead, because the ballot design gave a safer position
to the legislators located in the second column, as it was the case for the PPC ones, these
legislators were not removed. As a result, the final composition of the council included the new
seven legislators elected in the by-election plus the other nine elected in the 2010 election. The
sixteen legislators from PPC represent 41% of the council, even though this party never obtained
more than 30% of the votes. Hence, the possibility of the recall referendum, intended to keep
politicians accountable during their term, ends up having adverse effects on the representativity
of the political institutions.
13The figure where we shut down only the column differs from Figure B.7 only in the sense that both YES and
NO vote lines have a negative trend without intersecting.
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6 Conclusion
On one hand, Peru’s Constitution allows for an ad-hoc recall of politicians during their tenure.
This provision, together with regular elections, makes politicians more accountable to their
citizenry. In particular, it is meant to address the issue of moral hazard by increasing the
instances in which citizens can remove politicians from office. Moreover, as instance of direct
democracy, it also allows for a more direct supervision of the politicians activities and decisions.
On the other hand, we showed that the implementation of this provision and the “removal
referenda” have to be taken very seriously. A poorly designed ballot may have consequences that
go against the spirit of the rule of law, as it may have been the case in Lima’s 2013 referendum.
Rather than their performance, the order in which legislators were listed in the ballot and the
column in which they were placed were the main determinants of being removed from office:
the legislators position and column are better predictors of the electoral results than education,
partisan affiliation, political experience, and presence in media – jointly, they are two thousand
times better predictors than the other variables (see Tables B.6 and B.7). As a result, the
politicians listed in the second column were more likely to be confirmed in office, only due to
their position in the ballot.
Unfortunately, this case shows yet another instance in which institutional design has unin-
tended consequences. The old adagio – institutions matter – may still be true, but institutional
reform has to be accompanied with a thoroughly thought implementation. Furthermore, our
evidence indicates that electoral transparency scholars and international electoral observers may
also need to devote attention to ballot design. If these “details”, like ballot design, may tilt
elections in developed and strong democracies, younger democracies’ accountability mechanisms
may be threaten by a greater exposure to manipulation.
Last, we also proposed an under-exploited identification strategy: the combination of polling-
booth level data with a deep understanding of the assignment of voters to polling booths – in
our case according to the I.D. number. Yet, beyond the purposes of this paper, this strategy
can be used in different countries and contexts in which this disaggregation of data is available.
12
References
Alvarez, R. M., B. Sinclair, and R. L. Hasen (2006). How Much Is Enough? The” Ballot
Order Effect” and the Use of Social Science Research in Election Law Disputes. Election Law
Journal 5 (1), 40–56.
Augenblick, N. and S. Nicholson (2015). Ballot Position , Choice Fatigue , and Voter Behavior.
Review of Economic Studies, 1–27.
Banks, J. S. and J. Duggan (2005). Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections:
The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates. Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays
in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks, 15–56.
Cameron, A. and D. Miller (2015). A practitioner’s guide to cluster-robust inference. Journal
of Human Resources 50 (2), 317–372.
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political
Economy 65 (2), 135.
Enelow, J. and M. J. Hinich (1981). A New Approach to Voter Uncertainty in the Downsian
Spatial Model. American Journal of Political Science 25 (3), 483–493.
Esteve-Volart, B. and M. Bagues (2012). Are women pawns in the political game? Evidence
from elections to the Spanish Senate. Journal of Public Economics 96 (3-4), 387–399.
Feddersen, T. and W. Pesendorfer (1996). The swing voter’s curse. The American economic
review 86 (3), 408–424.
Feenberg, D., I. Ganguli, P. Gaule, and J. Gruber (2015). It’s Good to be First: Order Bias in
Reading and Citing NBER Working Papers.
Glejser, H. and B. Heyndels (2001). Inefficiency in the ranking in competitions: The case of the
Queen Elisabeth Music Contest. Journal of Cultural Economics 25 (2), 109–129.
Kamenica, E. (2014). Contextual Inference in Markets : On the Informational Content of
Product Lines. American Economic Review 98 (5), 2127–2149.
Liu, W. and I. Simonson (2005). Take It or Leave it?’-The Effect of Explicit Comparisons on
Commitment to Purchase. Advances in Consumer Research 32 (1), 453.
Meredith, M. and Y. Salant (2013). On the Causes and Consequences of Ballot Order Effects.
Political Behavior 35 (1), 175–197.
Peltzman, S. (1975). The Effects of Autombile Safety Regulation. The Journal of Political
Economy 83 (4), 677–726.
Riker, W. H. and P. C. Ordeshook (1968). A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. American
Political Science Review 62 (01), 25–42.
13
Rubinstein, A. and Y. Salant (2006). A model of choice from lists. Theoretical Economics 1,
3–17.
Wand, J. N., K. W. Shotts, J. S. Sekhon, W. R. Mebane, M. C. Herron, and H. E. Brady (2001).
The Butterfly Did It: The Aberrant Vote for Buchanan in Palm Beach County, Florida. The
American Political Science Review 95 (4), 793–810.
14
A Appendix
A.1 Institutional background
According to the Ley organica de Elecciones, Law number 26859, the following articles define
how voters are allocated to polling booths. Article 52 states that there must be between 200
and 300 voters per polling booth14, and Article 53 states that they are allocated according to
their order of registration in the district15.
A.2 Multinomial Probit
Having found an influence from the location in the voting ballot on the decision to not make a
decision (blank vote), we also try to study whether the location can also affect the decision to
finally mark a yes or no in the ballot. We do not expect an influence of location on preferences,
but since the latter can be correlated with unobserved characteristics of the voters (different
motivation to participate in this particular electoral process by political leaning, for example),
there could be an influence into the actual voting. On the other hand, while this model (under its
own assumptions) can also help to generate counterfactual scenarios of voting behavior under
different configurations of the ballot, it has to be taken as a guidance of the empirical work
rather than a literal explanation of the voting behavior.
We follow the discrete choice framework. In this formulation we consider a voter that has
to choose between three alternatives for each candidate: vote in favor of the recall (yes), vote
against (no), or express no preference (voting blank). We denote the voter as i, who is located
in the district d (in the estimations we use district, polling center or polling booth, but here
for simplicity we call it district generically). His or her choice for candidate c is denoted by j,
where:
j =

2 if the vote is YES
1 if the vote is NO
0 if the vote is BLANK
We assume that the drivers behind this decision are the utilities that the voter enjoys from
taking each decision, which we call Uijcd. The indexes indicate that this is the utility that voter
i, who votes in district d, enjoys for choosing alternative j for candidate c. This utility can
be affected by several characteristics of the candidates, as well as the preferences of the voter.
Some of the candidates characteristics are observed, like their location in the ballot (the order
and/or the column) so we include them in vector xc (we also add here a dummy variable for the
major Villara´n and candidate 31, Castan˜eda Jr., who were particularly salient during the whole
process). Another set of utility drivers could be unobserved, for example, electoral preferences:
left wingers (the majors political leaning), or voters that were distrustful of the main sponsor of
14Art´ıculo 52o En cada distrito pol´ıtico de la Repblica se conforman tantas mesas de sufragio como grupos
de 200 (doscientos) ciudadanos ha´biles para votar como mı´nimo y 300 (trescientos) como ma´ximo existan. El
nu´mero de ciudadanos por mesa de sufragio es determinado por la Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales.
15Art´ıculo 53o Las mesas tienen un nmero que las identifica y las listas de electores por mesa se hacen sobre la
base de los ciudadanos registrados en la circunscripcio´n, en orden nume´rico.
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the whole recall process (Castan˜eda, the father of the candidate 31 and former major), would
probably obtain higher satisfaction from alternative NO, and conversely. To capture the influence
of additional unobservables we also include two random drivers of the utility. The first is the
random variable θd, which captures the average preferences in district d. The final term, ijc is
a zero mean shock that captures any idiosyncratic preference for option j for candidate c for
voter i. Finally, we assume a linear shape, so that the utility takes the form:
Uijcd = xcβj + θjd + ij (2)
for j = {0, 1, 2}. The voter i will pick option j if this option gives greater utility than any other.
That is, the probability that voter i picks option j for candidate t is:
Pi(y = j) = Prob(Uijcd ≥ Uij′cd, ∀j′ 6= j).
Let ij = (i2, i1, i0) be the vector of idiosyncratic utility terms for the alternative of voting
yes (2), no (1) or blank (0) of voter i. Let φ(2, 1, 0) be its multivariate normal distribution,
so we can estimate a multinomial probit. Finally, let Vjcd = xcβj + θjd be the mean utility
obtained from choice j, given that the  terms has a zero mean. Hence
Pi(y = j) =
∫
I(Vjcd − Vj′cd ≥ ijc − ij′c)dF (ij),∀j′ 6= j,
For simplicity, we write Vjcd for yes (2), no (1) and blank (0) as follows: v2, v1 and v0, and
similarly with the random variables 2, 1 and 0. Hence the probability of voting YES is
Pi(y = 2) =
∫ ∞
2=−∞
∫ v2−v1+2
1=−∞
∫ v2−v0+2
0=−∞
φ(2, 1, 0)d2d1d0
Minimizing the observed YES and NO shares observed for each candidate in each table with
the ones predicted according to the previous equations we identify estimates for the sets of
parameters β and θ for YES and NO, with respect to blank. That is, we identify the terms in
parenthesis in the equations below.
V2cd − V0cd = xc(β2 − β0) + (θ2d − θ0d) (3)
V1cd − V0cd = xc(β1 − β0) + (θ1d − θ0d) (4)
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Figure B.1: Ballot as seen by the voters Figure B.2: Ballot as published in a newspaper
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B.2 Tables
Eligible Voters 6295952 Booths 36386
Turnout 5273790 Centers 888
Turnout % 83.8 Districts 43
Relative Sizes Min Max Average Sd
Voters per Booth 112 240 173 28
Voters per Center 1088 52460 7090 4467
Booths per Center 7 242 41 25
Voters per District 1298 631100 146417 134506
Booths per District 7 3529 846 770
Centers per District 1 79 21 18
All numbers are calculated after we dropped all observations for
which all votes cast for an official at a specific booth where coded
as “null.”
Table B.1: Description of 2013 Lima Referendum Data
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Official Party Age Gender National Level Local Level Education Media
Times Run Elected? Times Run Times Elected Level Exposure
SUSANA VILLARAN FS 65 Female 1 No 1 1 Bachelor (not completed) 1068
EDUARDO ARIEL ZEGARRA MENDEZ FS 51 Male 1 No 1 1 PhD (Economics) 111
MARISA GLAVE REMY FS 33 Female 0 N/A 2 2 Secondary 41
RAFAEL EDUARDO GARCIA MELGAR FS 59 Male 0 N/A 2 2 Bachelor (not completed) 4
PERFECTO VICTOR RAMIREZ CIFUENTES FS 65 Male 2 No 2 1 Secondary 5
ZOILA ELENA REATEGUI BARQUERO FS 34 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor (not completed) 4
LUIS VALER CORONADO FS 61 Male 3 0 4 3 Technical School 16
MARCO ANTONIO ZEVALLOS BUENO FS 40 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master (not completed) 21
SIGIFREDO MARCIAL VELASQUEZ RAMOS FS 54 Male 1 No 2 1 Post-graduate specialization 1
VICTORIA DE SOTOMAYOR COTRADO FS 26 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor (in progress) 3
LUISA MERCEDES MARTINEZ CORNEJO FS 33 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor 1
DORA BEATRIZ HERNANDO SANCHEZ FS 53 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor 2
INES CECILIA RODRIGUEZ VELASQUEZ FS 56 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor 1
JOSE LIBORIO ESTEVES ROBLES FS 60 Male 0 N/A 2 1 Bachelor 2
MONICA GISSELLA ERAZO TRUJILLO FS 33 Female 0 N/A 1 1 2
MANUEL ABELARDO CARDENAS MUOZ FS 52 Male 0 N/A 1 1 1
CAYO TITO QUILLAS FS 54 Male 0 N/A 2 1 Post-graduate specialization 14
OLGA CELINDA MORAN ARAUJO FS 50 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor 0
RONALD GONZALES PINEDA FS 29 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor (not completed) 3
MAIA LIBERTAD ROJAS BRUCKMANN FS 37 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Master 2
PEDRO JAVIER LOPEZ TORRES TUBBS FS 36 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master (in progress) 1
HERNAN NUEZ GONZALES FS 29 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor (not completed) 1
WALTER ARCESIO GUILLEN CASTILLO PPC 51 Male 0 N/A 3 3 Master 1
JAIME EDUARDO SALINAS LOPEZ TORRES PPC 51 Male 3 No 4 1 Master 4
EDGARDO RENAN DE POMAR VIZCARRA PPC 52 Male 1 No 3 1 Master 6
JOSE ALBERTO DANOS ORDOEZ PPC 67 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master 2
MONICA EMPERATRIZ SARAVIA SORIANO PPC 45 Female 1 NO 1 1 Master 0
JORGE RAFAEL VILLENA LARREA PPC 35 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor 4
LUZ MARIA DEL PILAR FREITAS ALVARADO PPC 63 Female 1 NO 1 1 Master 0
PABLO ALBERTO SECADA ELGUERA PPC 43 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master 55
LUIS MANUEL CASTAEDA PARDO PPC 29 Male 0 N/A 2 2 Bachelor 237
TERESA DE JESUS CANOVA SARANGO PPC 54 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Post-graduate specialization 8
ALBERTO VALENZUELA SOTO PPC 43 Male 0 N/A 2 1 Master 26
OSCAR JAVIER IBAEZ YAGUI PPC 37 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master 3
LUIS FELIPE CALVIMONTES BARRON PPC 48 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor 7
RUBEN SANTIAGO GAVINO SANCHEZ RN 54 Male 1 No 1 1 Bachelor 2
IVAN BECERRA HURTADO RN 42 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master 3
GERMAN RICARDO APARICIO LEMBCKE SP 70 Male 0 N/A 5 5 Bachelor 3
FERNAN ROMANO ALTUVE-FEBRES LORES CR 46 Male 2 Yes 2 1 Master 21
LUIS FELIPE CASTILLO OLIVA SU 38 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master 8
The “Run at” columns display how many times this official has run in local or national elections before the 2010 elections. The “Elected at
National Level” column shows if an official had been elected at the national level before the 2010 elections, and the “Elected at Local Level”
show how many times the official has been elected at the local level before the 2010 elections with N/A implying “Not Applicable”. Media
Exposure is the total number the official was mentioned in the leading Peruvian newspapers from 2010 until the day of the election.
Table B.2: Individual Characteristics of Elected Officials
Party Min. Share Max. Share Av. Share Sd. of Shares Seats
Fuerza Social 0.202 0.463 0.353 0.07 22
Partido Popular Cristiano - Unidad Nacional 0.239 0.665 0.404 0.113 13
Restauracio´n Nacional 0.039 0.183 0.081 0.026 2
Somos Peru´ 0.017 0.115 0.044 0.021 1
Cambio Radical 0.008 0.192 0.043 0.032 1
Siempre Unidos 0.005 0.138 0.027 0.033 1
Accio´n Popular 0.012 0.118 0.024 0.016 0
Alianza Para el Progreso 0.001 0.111 0.016 0.021 0
Partido Fonavisto del Peru´ 0.002 0.019 0.009 0.004 0
The second and third column refer to the maximum and minimum share a party got in a district. “Average
Share” and “Sd. of share” give the average and standard deviation of the district shares. Seats gives us the
number of seats the party got.
The first two “parties” are coalitions. Fuerza Social coalition includes: Fuerza Social, Movimiento Tierra y Lib-
ertad, Movimiento Nueva Izquierda, Movimiento Lima para Todos and independent candidates. PPC-Unidad
Nacional coalition includes: PPC-Unidad Nacional, Solidaridad Nacional, Peru Posible, and independent candi-
dates.
Table B.3: Results of 2010 Municipal Election of Lima
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Minimum Maximum Average Median Sd
Age 26 70 46.95 49 11.97
Times Candidate National 0 3 0.42 0 0.81
Times Candidate Local 1 5 1.57 1 0.98
Times Elected Local 1 5 1.27 1 0.78
Imputed Years of Education 11 20 15.47 15.5 1.94
Media Exposure 0 1068 42.35 3 171.3
The years of education have been imputed using the highest known educational level of the official, taking half
of the duration if this educational level was not completed. Media Exposure is the total number the official was
mentioned in the leading Peruvian newspapers from 2010 until the day of the election.
Table B.4: Summary Statistics of Elected Officials
Party Min. Share Max. Share Av. Share Sd. of Share Seats
Partido Popular Cristiano 0.155 0.555 0.316 0.097 7
Somos Peru´ 0.168 0.515 0.268 0.06 6
Peru Posible 0.04 0.19 0.099 0.033 2
Siempre Unidos 0.021 0.335 0.092 0.08 2
Accio´n Popular 0.068 0.298 0.102 0.037 2
Tierra y Dignidad 0.033 0.11 0.075 0.015 2
Partido Humanista Peruano 0.04 0.19 0.099 0.033 1
The second and third column refer to the maximum and minimum share a party got in a district. Average Share
and Sd of share give the average and standard deviation of the district shares. Seats gives us the number of seats
the party got.
Table B.5: Results of 2013 Municipal By-Election of Lima
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Order 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗
(0.000033) (0.0000083) (0.0000086) (0.00018) (0.000035) (0.000039)
Column 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.00033) (0.00033) (0.0077) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Column × Order -0.00084∗∗∗ -0.00084∗∗∗ -0.00077∗∗∗ -0.0054∗∗∗ -0.0054∗∗∗ -0.0048∗∗∗
(0.000081) (0.000016) (0.000015) (0.00036) (0.000052) (0.000057)
Mayor -0.061∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.57∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗
(0.00057) (0.00053) (0.0021) (0.0070) (0.0034) (0.0092)
Castan˜eda -0.0043∗∗∗ -0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.00027) (0.00047) (0.0049) (0.00082) (0.0019)
Right Party 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.00091) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.0039) (0.00064) (0.00071)
Minor Parties 0.0030∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ -0.0051∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.00027) (0.00032) (0.0063) (0.00088) (0.0011)
Party Share in 2010 elections -0.031∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗
(0.00038) (0.0015)
College -0.00071∗∗∗ -0.0034∗∗∗
(0.000085) (0.00037)
Age 0.0000076∗∗ 0.000034∗∗∗
(0.0000030) (0.000012)
Gender 0.00014∗∗ 0.00065∗∗
(0.000071) (0.00029)
Candidate in national elections -0.000023 -0.00049∗∗
(0.000056) (0.00023)
Candidate in local elections -0.000020 0.00053∗∗
(0.000064) (0.00024)
Elected in national elections -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0032∗∗∗
(0.00028) (0.00076)
Elected in local elections -0.00021∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗∗
(0.000072) (0.00027)
Media Exposure -0.000029∗∗∗ -0.00019∗∗∗
(0.0000020) (0.0000081)
Constant 0.089∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ -1.35∗∗∗ -1.33∗∗∗ -1.31∗∗∗
(0.00038) (0.00012) (0.00022) (0.0022) (0.0048) (0.0049)
FE No Center Center No Center Center
Method LS LS LS Probit Probit Probit
N 1451215 1451215 1451215 2902430 2902430 2902430
R2 0.2354 0.3868 0.3882
R¯2 0.2354 0.3864 0.3879
Log-Likelihood 4474294.4 4794554.6 4797960.5 -76153626.0 -75668239.8 -75667520.4
∆R2 0.0282 0.0282 0.017
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All regressions are clustered at the Center × Order level. Minor Parties is a dummy that takes value 1 if the official belonged neither to the
party of the Mayor neither to the right-wing coalition. College is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the official had at least finished
college. Gender is a dummy taking the value 1 if the official is a man. Party share in 2010 elections is the share that the party’s official
obtained in the 2010 elections in a district. Candidate variables count how many times the official was a candidate in the past and Elected
count how many times an official was elected in the past. Media Exposure is the total number the official was mentioned in the leading
Peruvian newspapers from 2010 until the day of the election. ∆R2 shows the difference in R2 between the full model and a restricted model
without Order, Column and Column× Order.
Table B.6: Estimations of blank share votes by table
Order 0.0040 College 0.00001
Column 0.0031 Age 0.00001
Column × Order 0.0004 Gender 0.00001
Mayor 0.0001 Candidate in national elections 0.00000
Castan˜eda 0.00001 Candidate in local elections 0.00000
Right Party 0.0001 Elected in national elections 0.00001
Minor Parties 0.0001 Elected in local elections 0.00000
Party Share in 2010 elections 0.0013 Media Exposure 0.00001
Table B.7: Squares of Semi-partial correlation Coefficients
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No Share No Share No Share
Order -0.0096∗∗∗ -0.0096∗∗∗ -0.0092∗∗∗
(0.00032) (0.00014) (0.00018)
Column -0.29∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.0060) (0.0067)
Column × Order 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗
(0.00068) (0.00028) (0.00032)
Mayor 0.76∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.0064) (0.038)
Castan˜eda -0.036∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0036) (0.0085)
Right Party -0.019∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0031) (0.0036)
Minor Parties -0.017 -0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.0049) (0.0060)
Party Share in 2010 elections 0.11∗∗∗
(0.0075)
College 0.0044∗∗
(0.0018)
Age -0.000079
(0.000065)
Gender -0.0023
(0.0015)
Candidate in national elections 0.00051
(0.0011)
Candidate in local elections -0.0013
(0.0014)
Elected in national elections 0.00035
(0.0043)
Elected in local elections 0.0025
(0.0016)
Media Exposure 0.00025∗∗∗
(0.000035)
Constant 1.16∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0025) (0.0048)
Yes Share Yes Share Yes Share
Order -0.0098∗∗∗ -0.0098∗∗∗ -0.0093∗∗∗
(0.00022) (0.00013) (0.00017)
Column -0.31∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗
(0.0092) (0.0059) (0.0067)
Column × Order 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗
(0.00044) (0.00028) (0.00032)
Mayor 0.69∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0064) (0.037)
Castan˜eda 0.080∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0042) (0.0087)
Right Party -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0031) (0.0036)
Minor Parties -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0049) (0.0058)
Party Share in 2010 elections -0.037∗∗∗
(0.0068)
College 0.0041∗∗
(0.0017)
Age -0.0000047
(0.000064)
Gender 0.00066
(0.0015)
Candidate in national elections 0.00075
(0.0011)
Candidate in local elections -0.000068
(0.0014)
Elected in national elections 0.0075∗
(0.0042)
Elected in local elections 0.00041
(0.0015)
Media Exposure 0.00023∗∗∗
(0.000035)
Constant 1.19∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0045)
FE No District District
N 4353645 4353645 4353645
Log-Likelihood -199726345.0 -198379308.7 -198375258.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All regressions are clustered at the Center × Order level. Minor Parties is a dummy
that takes value 1 if the official belonged neither to the party of the Mayor neither to
the right-wing coalition. College is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the official
had at least finished college. Gender is a dummy taking the value 1 if the official is
a man. Party share in 2010 elections is the share that the party’s official obtained
in the 2010 elections in a district. Candidate variables count how many times the
official was a candidate in the past and Elected count how many times an official was
elected in the past. Media Exposure is the total number the official was mentioned
in the leading Peruvian newspapers from 2010 until the day of the election.
Table B.8: Multinomial Probit estimations of structural model at the City Level
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Villa El Salvador San Isidro
No Share No Share
Order -0.011∗∗∗ -0.0080∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Column -0.30∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.040)
Column × Order 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0019)
Mayor 0.54∗∗ 0.31
(0.24) (0.23)
Castan˜eda -0.040 -0.23∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.048)
Right Party -0.020 -0.11
(0.057) (0.30)
Minor Parties -0.0073 0.083
(0.12) (0.12)
Party Share in 2010 elections 0.021 0.35
(0.38) (0.70)
College 0.0077 -0.0015
(0.011) (0.011)
Age -0.00014 -0.000066
(0.00042) (0.00041)
Gender -0.00011 -0.0094
(0.0098) (0.0093)
Candidate in national elections 0.0011 -0.0010
(0.0074) (0.0073)
Candidate in local elections -0.0013 0.0010
(0.0091) (0.0080)
Elected in national elections -0.0024 0.033
(0.033) (0.023)
Elected in local elections 0.0019 -0.00065
(0.010) (0.0096)
Media Exposure 0.00013 0.00062∗∗∗
(0.00022) (0.00021)
Constant 1.05∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.13)
Yes Share Yes Share
Order -0.011∗∗∗ -0.0090∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.00081)
Column -0.32∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.038)
Column × Order 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0018)
Mayor 0.50∗ 0.31∗
(0.26) (0.19)
Castan˜eda 0.0027 0.15∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.044)
Right Party -0.028 0.22
(0.060) (0.31)
Minor Parties -0.025 -0.25∗∗
(0.13) (0.12)
Party Share in 2010 elections -0.023 -0.84
(0.40) (0.72)
College 0.0072 0.0014
(0.012) (0.0080)
Age -0.00016 0.000046
(0.00045) (0.00035)
Gender 0.0016 -0.0046
(0.010) (0.0080)
Candidate in national elections 0.00090 -0.000054
(0.0079) (0.0059)
Candidate in local elections -0.00045 0.0053
(0.0097) (0.0080)
Elected in national elections 0.0035 0.0052
(0.035) (0.025)
Elected in local elections 0.0013 0.000083
(0.011) (0.0088)
Media Exposure 0.00013 0.00044∗∗
(0.00024) (0.00017)
Constant 1.16∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.13)
N 181416 47757
Log-Likelihood -9138692.5 -1879681.3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All regressions are clustered at the Center × Order level. Minor Parties is a dummy
that takes value 1 if the official belonged neither to the party of the Mayor neither to
the right-wing coalition. College is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the official
had at least finished college. Gender is a dummy taking the value 1 if the official is
a man. Party share in 2010 elections is the share that the party’s official obtained
in the 2010 elections in a district. Candidate variables count how many times the
official was a candidate in the past and Elected count how many times an official was
elected in the past. Media Exposure is the total number the official was mentioned
in the leading Peruvian newspapers from 2010 until the day of the election.
Table B.9: Multinomial Probit estimations of structural model for Villa El Salvador and San
Isidro
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(1) (2)
Order 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗
(0.000047) (0.0000058)
Column 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.00022)
Column × Order -0.00077∗∗∗ -0.00077∗∗∗
(0.000059) (0.000010)
Mayor -0.031∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0014)
Castaneda 0.0026 0.0027∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.00030)
Right Party 0.0044∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.00012)
Minor Parties -0.0051∗∗ -0.0051∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.00019)
Party Share in 2010 elections -0.031∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.00022)
College -0.00071 -0.00070∗∗∗
(0.00065) (0.000056)
Age 0.0000076 0.0000071∗∗∗
(0.000013) (0.0000020)
Gender 0.00014 0.00014∗∗∗
(0.00030) (0.000048)
Candidate in national elections -0.000023 -0.000019
(0.00019) (0.000037)
Candidate in local elections -0.000020 -0.000029
(0.00023) (0.000043)
Elected in national elections -0.0015∗∗ -0.0016∗∗∗
(0.00064) (0.00014)
Elected in local elections -0.00021 -0.00020∗∗∗
(0.00025) (0.000049)
Media Exposure -0.000029∗∗∗ -0.000030∗∗∗
(0.0000090) (0.0000013)
Constant 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.00014)
FE Center Booth
Clustering Center× Order (multiway) Booth× Order
N 1451215 1451215
r2 0.39 0.88
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
College is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the official had at least finished
college. Minor Parties is a dummy that takes value 1 if the official belonged neither to
the party of the Mayor neither to the right-wing coalition. Gender is a dummy taking
the value 1 if the official is a man. Party share in 2010 elections is the share that
the party’s official obtained in the 2010 elections in a district. Candidate variables
count how many times the official was a candidate in the past and Elected count how
many times an official was elected in the past. Media Exposure is the total number
the official was mentioned in the leading Peruvian newspapers from 2010 until the
day of the election.
Table B.10: Blank Share of Votes: Additional Robustness Checks.
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